Abstract: This article describes a new method to perform fault detection and isolation for a closed-loop-controlled autonomous aircraft. This vehicle is equipped with standard sensors and actuators, and its dynamics is non-linear. It is assumed that a guidance law and a control loop have been designed to achieve a given mission. The diagnosis method uses the resulting control objectives to generate residuals indicative of the presence of faults. Two classical guidance laws are considered, leading to different control constraints and diagnosis signals. A structural sensitivity analysis shows that all sensor and actuator faults can be detected and all sensor faults isolated, for both laws. The fault diagnosis procedure does not require the costly integration of the model of the system, and the closed-loop scheme makes it robust to model uncertainty. Realistic simulation results with strong model and measurement uncertainty demonstrate the potential of the approach. A theoretical analogy with observer-based fault diagnosis is also derived.
INTRODUCTION
To check the ability of an aircraft to complete its mission, there is an absolute necessity to identify early unexpected changes in the system (referred to as faults) before they lead to a complete breakdown. Procedures of fault detection and isolation (FDI) address such a problem. The application considered here is an autonomous aircraft equipped with a fixed set of sensors and actuators, controlled by classical guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) algorithms. Faults affecting propulsion, flight control surfaces, or sensors of this type of vehicle should be carefully addressed, as they cause 80 per cent of flight incidents according to a reliability study from the Office of the US Secretary of Defense [1] . A classical way to tackle the problem is hardware redundancy, i.e. several devices performing the same function with a voting scheme to detect and isolate faults. However, this approach implies higher costs, lower autonomy and reduced payload, because of the additional weight, volume and power required. The large majority of modern FDI methods thus rely on analytical redundancy, which exploits the relations between measured or estimated variables to detect possible system dysfunctions [2] [3] [4] . These methods most often generate residuals to quantify the distance between the measured and expected behaviours. These signals should remain small as long as there is no fault, and become sufficiently large to be noticeable whenever a fault occurs [5, 6] . Such an analytical redundancy strategy should be defined to tackle the difficult problem of detection and isolation of faults that can occur on any sensor or actuator of the aircraft, with a reduced computational cost to respect embedding constraints.
Numerous FDI strategies have been applied to aeronautical systems. The main model-based methods, such as parity space, parameter estimation, or *Corresponding author: ONERA -The French Aerospace Laboratory, F-91761 Palaiseau, France. email: julien.marzat@onera.fr observer-based FDI, have been developed initially for linear systems [7] . In aerospace, though, non-linear models provide a more accurate representation of the vehicle complex behaviour. Most of the methods have thus been extended via linearization [8] . There is also an emerging trend towards fully non-linear FDI methods [9, 10] . Using these methods, some authors have considered sensor faults only [7, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , actuator faults only [9, 10, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , or non-simultaneous sensor and actuator faults [8, 21, 22] .
The applicability of these methods relies heavily on the modelled dynamics of the system to design dynamical filters. This involves a very significant computational cost, given the limited resources available on-board. In most of these studies, the closedloop control of the aircraft is ignored when building the FDI procedure. This seems unfortunate, as control information may provide additional insight on the system behaviour and thus help detect and isolate faults.
An interesting idea in this context is active fault diagnosis, which injects an auxiliary input into the system in an attempt to facilitate distinction between faulty and normal behaviours [23] . This technique has been applied in two recent studies concerning small UAVs [16, 17] , with the addition of a small sinusoidal component to the control signal of actuators suspected of faults. Even if this strategy may accelerate decision, there is no systematic approach to designing such signals and guaranteeing that the additional input will not deteriorate performance in normal operating condition or even destabilize the system [24] . A different route is pursued here, and FDI methods that use control information without interfering with the control loop are considered.
The effect of feedback on fault diagnosis methods has been analysed in reference [25] and more recently in reference [26] . They show that model uncertainty or multiplicative faults make the residuals depend on the control signal. More generally, the control input holds relevant information concerning faults in a feedback-controlled system. As there is a trade-off to achieve between fault detection and performance of the closed-loop system, the simultaneous design of the control law and the observation filter has been addressed [18, 27] . Multi-objective optimization methods are used to maximize the effect of faults on the diagnosis filter while still achieving control objectives. All these studies have made a first step towards taking into account the closed-loop behaviour in the diagnosis procedure. However, it should be noted that the diagnosis filter does not use control information directly: its structure is still designed for the open-looped system.
To complete the description of the context of this study, closed-loop performance monitoring should also be mentioned. Even if this topic is weakly related to fault diagnosis in general, it is of some interest here as it focuses on detecting changes in control performances. The objective is to assess whether the controller performs suitably by comparing the observed variance of the feedback signal with its expected value, using statistical tools [28, 29] .
The new method proposed in this article considers fault diagnosis from a point of view that is similar in spirit to performance monitoring. The main assumption is that guidance and control have been designed to comply at each instant of time with the mission requirements in fault-free conditions. Thus, the closed-loop system is seen as a single entity designed with instantaneous control objectives that can be translated into residuals. Although local variations of these residuals around zero are of course unavoidable, large enough variations may be indicative of faults that affect the controlled aircraft. This article shows that it is indeed possible to detect sensor and actuator faults and to isolate sensor faults by analysing the adequacy of the system response. The properties of feedback control ensure high robustness of this strategy towards model uncertainty. The computational cost is low, because control objectives are generally expressed by simple static functions and there is therefore no need to integrate the differential equations of a dynamical model of the system. This article is organized as follows. The explicit non-linear mathematical model of a representative aeronautical case study is given in section 2, along with its GNC scheme and models of faults and uncertainty. The new FDI approach is then detailed in section 3. It is shown how residuals could be generated from the knowledge of the control objectives of guidance laws, and how to assess their qualitative sensitivity to sensor and actuator faults. Corresponding simulation results on a collection of faulty scenarios with strong, realistic measurement and model uncertainty are given in section 4. Quantitative indices are computed to assess the performance of the method. Section 5 presents an analogy of this method with classical observerbased FDI. Conclusions and perspectives are discussed in section 6.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE AIRCRAFT
The vehicle considered is a surface-to-air missile on an interception mission. Actuation is performed via four classical tail flight control surfaces acting on roll, pitch and yaw, and propulsion along the main axis of the vehicle. An inertial measurement unit (IMU), comprising three gyros and three accelerometers, is coupled with an inertial navigation system (INS) that integrates these measurements to estimate the whole state vector of the missile. These standard components are preset and there is no hardware redundancy. These features are not specific to the case study and are shared by other applications, such as an UAV on an exploratory mission. The aircraft geometry in body frame is displayed in Fig. 1 . The dynamics of the aircraft is modelled by a non-linear state-space model, detailed in section 2.1. The interception is achieved by a standard GNC scheme (section 2.2), including a guidance loop and a fast control loop. Two classical guidance laws are considered, namely pure pursuit (PP) and proportional navigation guidance (PNG).
Sensor faults may affect independently the measurement of any gyro or accelerometer. Concerning actuators, the loss-of-effectiveness of the thruster, the locking-in-place of the fins or their unwanted oscillation will be investigated. Mathematical models of faults are presented in section 2.3. The meaning of all the variables and parameters involved is explained in Appendix.
Dynamics and state-space model
The force equation is
where 
Due to the geometry of the aircraft (cylindrical and symmetric), the inertia matrix is
The momentum equation is then
The model description should be completed with the coordinate transformation from the body frame to the inertial frame 
Model of actuators
The dynamics of the propulsion rate is described by a first-order linear model. The missile is manoeuvred using classical tail control. The four flight control surfaces (Fig. 2 ) are two elevators with deflection angles 2 and 4 , and two rudders with deflection angles 1 and 3 . Their servomotors are modelled as secondorder systems with saturations in angular position and velocity. The equivalent deflection angles are then computed as
Although there are four actuators for three actions, this is not hardware redundancy as defined in section 1, since these devices are independent and do not achieve the same actions. The system has nevertheless one supplementary degree of actuation, but this cannot be used straightforward to achieve diagnosis.
Model of sensors
The IMU measures non-gravitational acceleration via three accelerometers, and angular velocity via three gyros. . Errors affecting the measurements are usually modelled as biases, scale factors, and noise. For example, the measurementr of the yaw rate r is expressed as
where k r is the scale factor, b r the bias, and w r a zeromean Gaussian white noise, with standard deviation r . The parameters, k i , b i , and i (for each sensor i independently) are the characteristics of the IMU and set in the simulated test case at typical values (Table 3 ).
Guidance and control (GNC)
The GNC scheme is described in Fig. 3 . Exogenous information about the target is provided by a tracking device, which is either embedded (e.g. a seeker) or ground-based (e.g. a radar). In this study, a ground radar is assumed to measure the position
T of the target, both in the inertial frame. These measurements are assumed to suffer zero-mean additive Gaussian white noise on each variable independently [32] .
In order to reduce the distance between the missile and the target to zero, a classical GNC architecture with decoupled guidance and dynamic control is implemented. The main loop implements a guidance law that provides the desired trajectory and orientation of the missile, based on the geometric and kinematic constraints of the problem. This makes it possible to compute appropriate thrust, while the fast inner control loop acts on the fins to meet the guidance commands and stabilizes the aircraft in flight [32] . The GNC laws considered here are well known to handle low-manoeuvring targets.
Guidance laws
The geometry of the interception problem on which most guidance laws are based is now briefly recalled and illustrated in Fig. 4 . The following definitions are a prerequisite to describing these guidance laws [33] .
1. The difference between the missile and target positions is the line of sight (LOS), r ¼ x t À x m . 2. The opposite of the first derivative of the LOS with respect to time is the closing velocity,
The orientation of the LOS is given by the LOS angles, which form the vector k, and the LOS rate
Two potential guidance laws are considered in this study, namely PP and PNG. These laws are built on the following geometrical rules.
1. Pure Pursuit: PP makes the velocity of the pursuer v m coincide with the LOS r. This is the first guidance law that has been developed, inspired by how predators catch their prey [33] . The simplest guidance consign is then to have the acceleration input proportional to the angle between the aircraft velocity and the LOS. This is known as velocity pursuit. Another version aims at aligning the main axis of the vehicle on the LOS: this is attitude pursuit. In this study, velocity pursuit will be used. 2. Proportional navigation guidance: PNG achieves parallel navigation. The geometrical rule is to keep the direction of the LOS constant relative to inertial space, i.e. the LOS is kept parallel to its initial value. This is also called constant bearing and the rule could be very concisely stated as the LOS rate being driven to zero [34] . The guidance consign is taken proportional to the LOS rate. Figure 5 shows a successful target interception by the missile described in section 2.1 with either of these two guidance laws (initial conditions of the simulation are given in section 4).
Control
The control loop is designed so as to have a response time significantly lower than that of the guidance loop. Provided that the thruster is still operating, a proportional controller computes the propulsion rate to regulate speed at a desired reference level. The autopilot consists of three independent linear 
Faults and model uncertainty
A mathematical model of actuator and sensor faults is needed to complete the modelling of the problem. Two types of control inputs are distinguished: the (known) control input, as computed by the GNC module is u c , and the (unknown) actual control input as achieved by the corresponding actuator is u a . An actuator fault results in a discrepancy between u c and u a , which expresses the fact that the control input sent by the GNC module is not correctly implemented by the actuator. The actuator faults considered are the locking-in-place or unwanted oscillation of a fin and the loss-of-effectiveness of the thruster. They will be modelled as
Depending on the type of fault occurring at time t fault , one has
The locking-in-place of flight control surfaces may be due, e.g. to freezing or power failure. Oscillatory failure cases (OFC) are implied by electronic components generating low-frequency periodical disturbances in the control signal of the actuators [35] . Similar modelling for actuator faults can be found in references [30, 36] .
Sensor faults are modelled as abrupt unexpected jumps in one or more of the uncertainty parameters of the IMU (bias, scale factors, and standard deviation of the Gaussian noise, see (10)).
To take into account the strong uncertainty on the value of the aerodynamic coefficients, each nominal function c (Á) is randomly multiplied by either 0.75 or 1.25 with probability 0.5 before each simulation, while keeping a control designed on the nominal values.
CLOSED-LOOP FAULT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH
Detection and isolation of faults affecting sensors and actuators for the benchmark defined in section 2 is a challenging issue, as the state equations are intertwined due to the changes of coordinates between inertial and body frames and to the coupling between longitudinal and lateral variables. Moreover, there is strong uncertainty on the aerodynamic coefficients of the non-linear dynamical model, which makes it even more difficult to design a reliable estimation filter. To overcome these issues, diagnosis is considered from the point of view of the success of the mission, and thus to analyse the guidance and control objectives to generate residuals.
Principles
The new fault diagnosis approach exploits the control objectives of the closed-loop-controlled aircraft. The main assumption is that the guidance law and the control loop have been adequately tuned to achieve these objectives, based on the knowledge of the aircraft dynamics. These objectives require the aircraft to respect some geometric and kinematic constraints. The idea of the method is to use these constraints to build residuals indicative of the presence of faults. Indeed, control may fail when faults affect the aircraft [26, 28] .
As they are (possibly multivariate) functions of known variables (outputs, estimated state, and known references), these residuals can be computed at each instant of time, without requiring the costly integration of the non-linear state-space model of the aircraft. Nevertheless, the knowledge of this model provides information on the sensitivity to faults of the variables involved in this computation.
In summary, control objectives portray the desired global behaviour of the closed-loop system without the need to investigate the dynamics deeply. Monitoring the distance between the expected and actual values of control objectives is similar in spirit to classical FDI methods based on parameter or state estimation, which test whether the estimated values of monitored variables are consistent with their expected values. The approach proposed here is presumably totally new, as no other study seems to have reported the use of control objectives to generate residuals indicating the presence of faults. The control error has only been used in the performancemonitoring context to assess the efficiency of the controller [29] but not to detect faults affecting the process. Section 3.2 explains the generation of the residuals from the guidance laws and section 3.3 shows how to assess their sensitivity to faults.
Residuals
The control objective of a guidance law is most often to make the missile respect a geometrical rule based on the definitions of section 2.2.1. This constraint provides an immediate collection of residuals, under the assumption that the guidance and control laws have been tuned adequately, and that the control loop is fast compared to the guidance loop.
Residuals with PP law
In velocity-pursuit guidance, the angle between the velocity vector v m of the missile and the line of sight r to the target is driven to zero. Four scalar residuals are thus generated. The first three express that the cross-product of these two vectors should be close to zero and the last one expresses the fact that the scalar product should be equal to the product of their norms
To facilitate visual interpretation, the three scalar residuals r , where the arcsine function is considered componentwise [37] . The informational content of the residuals would remain the same.
Moreover, the fast control loop has been designed to achieve stabilization and thus to drive the angular rates to zero. Therefore, the missile angular velocity u provides three additional scalar residuals
Residuals with PNG law
The objective of the proportional navigation guidance law is to nullify the LOS rate _ k. Since the computational form of the LOS rate is _ k ¼ r Â _ r ð Þ= r k k 2 , this is equivalent to aligning r with _ r . Thus, as with the PP law, three residuals are obtained from the cross-product of these two vectors, and the scalar product can be used to generate a fourth scalar residual. Their expressions are
Since the fast control loop is independent from the guidance law, the three additional residuals derived from the nullity of the angular velocity u could also be used here
Note that the residuals defined in (14) and (17) present the unusual characteristic of being non-negative, making bilateral tests inappropriate.
Propulsion residual
The guidance residuals previously described will be used to monitor the behaviour of the sensors and tail fins. However, all these residuals are insensitive (or only momentarily sensitive) to faults occurring in the propulsion, as propulsion regulation is decoupled from the rest of the control and since the guidance constraints may still be satisfied. Another control objective should thus be investigated to monitor the behaviour of the thruster. A classical indicator of the fate of the interception mission is the time-to-go, t go , defined as the time remaining before the missile reaches the target. The most frequently used estimator of t go is the quotient of the norms of LOS and closing velocity [38] 
Simulations with no fault on the propulsion and with a 50 per cent loss of effectiveness, in the conditions of Fig. 5 , give the results displayed in Fig. 6 for the PP law. Similar results are obtained when using PNG. These results illustrate the fact that, in normal operation, the time-to-go estimate is regularly decreasing and follows an almost linear slope. When a propulsion loss takes place, the slope changes while it remains approximately the same with faults affecting the rudders.
Basically, the aircraft is slowed down by this propulsion loss and, if at all possible, the interception should take place later than expected. This propulsion fault has a strong effect on velocity regulation, leading to an abrupt change of the slope. To identify this change, an adaptive slope tracker algorithm has been proposed in reference [37] . The idea is to estimate (by least squares) the parameters of the linear slope on a time interval, and use them to predict the expected values of t go on the next interval. The meansquared error between the prediction and the value estimated by (19) is computed on this next interval. One error value per interval is thus obtained, except for the first one. This error signal e prop is expected to be small in normal operating conditions and large for the interval where the slope change occurs, indicating the time of the propulsion fault. Results on the evolution of this error signal with and without a 50 per cent loss of effectiveness of the propulsion at time are displayed in Fig. 7 . This shows that such a fault may be detected with a delay equal to the size of the time sliding window (here 1 s).
Qualitative sensitivity analysis
Seven residuals have been designed for each guidance law, with an additional one dedicated to the analysis of the propulsion behaviour. As this last signal is dedicated to one fault while being insensitive to the others, the study will focus on the analysis of the guidance residuals.
So far, the objectives of the guidance laws have led to the definition of residuals as explicit functions of the available measurements. However, no information is available yet about the sensitivity of these residuals to sensor and actuator faults. The first step to achieve this analysis is to identify the variables that are affected by the faults considered. The presence of these variables in the residuals will then reveal sensitivity to the corresponding faults.
For the PP law, (13) and (14) yield
For the PNG law, (16) and (17) give similarly Residuals generated with the PP and PNG laws differ, but a close look at equations (20) to (24) shows that the same variables are involved, implying that sensitivity to faults will be qualitatively the same for the two guidance laws.
Sensor faults
Consider the faults affecting the accelerometers (axes x, y, and z). An additive fault on a acceleration measurement will induce a fault f x on the corresponding velocity measurement _ x and also a fault f ix on the position measurement x via double integration. Note that this additive model is generic, as the fault can take any value. To analyse the sensitivity of the residuals to these faults, _
x is replaced by its fault model _ x þ f x À Á and so on for the other variables in (20) and (21) , which now become
The way residuals (24) are built makes them insensitive to these accelerometer faults. The same computation can be made for the PNG residuals (22) and (23), leading to very similar expressions. The sensitivity of each residual to the accelerometer faults is given by the presence of these faults in the above expressions. Thus, r Table 1 .
Consider now faults affecting the gyro axes, i.e. the measurements of p, q, r. The residuals r 5 pp , and r 5 png are sensitive to faults on p, and the 6th and 7th residuals of each guidance law are, respectively, sensitive to faults affecting q and r. This makes it possible to fill in the last three rows of Table 1 .
Due to the fast attitude stabilization loop, gyro faults have also an effect on the first four residuals, because the control loop involves the difference between the past and present gyro measurements. This was not the case for accelerometer faults, since acceleration measurements are used only in the guidance loop and therefore do not influence the faster stabilization loop. The study of the influence of gyro faults on the first four residuals via this loop can be carried out analytically by investigating the dynamics of the force equation (1) . This equation contains a cross-product which can be developed as 
This explicit form provides the following information:
(a) faults on measurements of q or r affect the measurement of acceleration on the x axis; (b) faults on measurements of p or r affect the measurement of acceleration on the y axis; (c) faults on measurements of p or q affect the measurement of acceleration on the z axis.
Residuals from (20) to (23) are made of products between at least two variables obtained from accelerometer measurements (y and z for r 1 pp ; x and z for r 2 pp ; x and y for r 3 pp ; x, y and z for r 4 pp ). From the above analysis, the four residuals are sensitive to faults on the three gyro measurements, which completes the sensitivity analysis for sensor faults.
The fault signature table for sensor faults is now complete (Table 1 ). This classical tool in fault diagnosis is used to summarize the potential detection and isolation of a collection of possible faults with a given set of residuals. The 'X' symbol indicates that the fault is detectable with the residual considered while the '-' symbol means that the residual is structurally insensitive to the fault.
The analysis of this table reveals that all faults affecting either accelerometers or gyros are detectable and isolable, since the rank of the signature table is full (in other words, the signature of each fault is unique). 
Actuator faults
A similar analytical sensitivity analysis is now performed for faults that may affect the rudders and elevators of the aircraft. Consider first the force equation (1), and the influence of the equivalent actuator deflections l , m , n which is detailed in (2) . Since the faults affect the actual rudders and elevators 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , the equivalent angles should be replaced by the actual ones using (9) . The aerodynamic forces from (2) can thus be rewritten
The analysis of these new equations reveals that png consist of products between variables obtained from those accelerometer measurements. Therefore, the four residuals are structurally sensitive to faults affecting any of the four actuators 1 , 2 , 3 , and 4 .
Consider now the momentum equation (5), and the influence of the actuators given by (6) . The torques can be rewritten as functions of the actual deflection angles as A first analysis of the above torque equations indicates that measurements of p and r are sensitive to faults affecting any rudder or elevator, while the measurement of q should only be sensitive to faults on the elevators 1 and 3 . However, the dynamics of the roll, pitch, and yaw rates expressed in (5) should be considered. The geometry of the vehicle reveals that the product pr acts on the dynamics of q, and that the product pq acts on the dynamics of r. Therefore, if a fault on 2 or 4 occurs, both measurements of p and r will be affected. This implies that the product pr would not be close to zero anymore, and thus the measurement of q will be affected by these faults through (5) . The three residuals r png are structurally sensitive to faults on any of the four actuators. Detection of such faults is thus possible but not isolation, due to the high level of coupling in the aircraft dynamics. These findings are summarized in Table 2 .
Remarks
The dynamical model is not used to generate the residuals, which are derived directly from the control law and true whatever the controlled aircraft. The only step depending on the aircraft model is the structural sensitivity analysis, which does not require a deep knowledge of the value of uncertain parameters such as aerodynamic coefficients.
It is well known that the design of a closed-loop control law does not require an extreme precision of the description of the dynamics of the system. As the test case presented in section 4 will confirm,
bz q c nr r 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 a high level of robustness towards model uncertainty can thus be expected. The proposed diagnosis method can be said to be as robust as the control law can be. Although isolation of actuator faults cannot be performed through this method, their detection can still be achieved. Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between actuator and sensor faults, since the signatures of actuator faults differ from those of sensor faults. This information is thus very useful, as it is obtained at a very low computational cost (remember that the residuals are readily obtained from the guidance module). If isolation of actuator faults is required -e.g. to reconfigure the control law -then a complementary dedicated actuator fault isolation method (such as those described in references [10, 17] ) may be called upon to lift suspicion, once detection has been confirmed using the guidance and control residuals. However, the link between the two strategies and the detection delay induced by this new scheme remain to be addressed.
It is, however, well known that the control law may be naturally tolerant to some actuator faults [25, 26] . This may particularly arise in the present case, because the control actuators have one degree of redundancy. The method that has been described is thus well suited to detect critical faults that impact the entire dynamics of the aircraft and thus endanger the mission. Also note that if the system partly tolerates an actuator fault, this would lead to an unknown fault signature that is a priori different from the one of sensor faults. When such a signature is observed, a complementary isolation method could also be employed to investigate the matter further.
SIMULATION RESULTS
This section shows the results of the method presented in section 3 on the non-linear aircraft model detailed in section 2, for several types of sensor and actuator faults. For the sake of brevity, results are shown only for one of the guidance laws (alternatively PP or PNG) for each scenario. The only exception is Scenario 1 for which PP and PNG results are both displayed, since this non-faulty case serves as a reference.
Setting
The simulate time step is 0.01 s. Flight conditions are given in Table 3 , comprising nominal speed, initial position, and uncertainty parameters for the missile and target. As detailed in section 2.3, all aerodynamic coefficients suffer a modelling error of AE25 per cent.
A collection of fault scenarios are designed, considering the fault-free case, sensor faults, and actuator faults (see summary in Table 4 ). The seven residuals for the two guidance laws and for each of the fault scenarios of Table 4 are displayed in Figs 8 to 17 and commented.
Scenario 1: Fault-free case
This case is given as a reference. After about 5 s for the PP law, and at most 10 s for the PNG law, the seven residuals remain very small, validating the simplifying assumption of a weak influence of the transients (Figs 10 and 11 ).
Sensor faults
Sensor faults affecting either accelerometers (scenarios 2 and 3) or gyros (scenarios 4 and 5) are considered.
Scenario 2
The fault on the x axis of the accelerometer is quickly detected by the second, third, and fourth residuals, while the other ones are not affected (Fig. 10) . This is in adequation with Table 1 . 
Scenario 3
The fault on the z axis of the accelerometer makes the first, second, and fourth residuals react. Note that a small transient effect is observed on the sixth residual, but the signal immediately returns to its initial mean and this would not lead to high false alarms with a statistical decision test ( Fig. 11 ; see performances indices in Table 5 ).
Scenario 4
The fault on the gyro measuring p causes a change in the mean of the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth residuals. This last one even allows an identification of the fault, as it corresponds to the discrepancy between the required and measured value of the roll rate (Fig. 12 ).
Scenario 5
This scenario demonstrates the possibility to detect and isolate two successive faults affecting gyros, according to their fault signatures ( Table 1) . The fault on the gyro measuring q is first detected as in Scenario 5, making the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth residuals react. The second fault affecting the gyro measuring r then occurs and causes a change in the mean in the seventh residual, which also allows its identification. Note that a transient effect is observed on the fifth residual, which returns quickly to its initial small mean value (Fig. 13) . 
Actuator faults
Two types of faults affecting the rudders or elevators are considered, namely oscillatory failure case and locking-in-place.
Scenario 6: oscillatory failure
The oscillatory failure considered is a critical fault, as it makes all the residuals react according to Table 2 . In this case, the entire dynamics of the aircraft is affected by the fault. Decision on fault detection is obtained quickly; however, no isolation can be made. A complementary fault isolation method should be used to identify the faulty actuator once the decision has been confirmed (Fig. 14) .
Scenario 7: locking-in-place
The locking-in-place of an actuator (here, rudder 3 ) is probably one of the most difficult faults to detect with This strongly depends on the conditions of excitation of the actuators. For the PNG law, the seven residuals react to the fault (even if some react weakly), which leads to a correct detection of an actuator fault. Hence, the effect of faults may be spotted even with redundant actuators (Fig. 15) .
Scenario 8: target evasion
An important concern during interception is the ability of the pursuer to reach the target. It is thus interesting to detect whether the target performs evasive manoeuvres or if its speed is too high compared to that of the pursuer, which will ultimately make the interception fail. Such a problem has a direct impact on the guidance constraints that are used as residuals. Scenario 9 considers a target escaping with a speed twice that of the pursuer, which is a very simple case of impossible interception. The first four guidance residuals react, or are even unable to decrease to a small value. The control residuals monitoring the roll, pitch, and yaw rates are less impacted, as the stabilization of the aircraft is still effective. Therefore, unknown fault signatures are observed, which may lead to the use of a complementary actuator fault isolation strategy (if applicable), revealing that no actuator is faulty and that the problem comes from the target that is out of the reach of the missile. Such an occurrence may also be identified by the exogenous tracking device (Fig. 16 ).
Comments and quantitative performance evaluation
These results show that, at a small computational cost and on difficult problems, it is possible to detect and isolate single and possibly successive faults affecting sensors, and that actuator faults or target evasion maneuvers are detectable. The diagnosis method remains effective in the presence of strong measurement and model uncertainty, since this approach is based on the closed-loop control law, which is naturally robust to such phenomena. The method is used to generate residuals that react to the faults considered. The next step of the diagnosis procedure requires the use of a change-detection method that will analyse the residuals to decide whether these signals are close to their mean. This step provides a Boolean decision for each residual, and the complete signatures can be compared to Table 1 to make a decision on the faults that have occurred.
The chosen test can also be used to compute quantitative indices showing the performance of the method regarding, e.g. false alarm rates and detection delays. The statistical test that has been chosen here is the bilateral CUSUM test [39, 40] . The performance indices are computed as indicated in reference [36] .
The nominal mean and variance of each residual are estimated from the first 100 values after convergence. The signal is then normalized to zero mean and unit variance, to be able to apply the same statistical test despite the initial differences of magnitude of the residuals. The parameters of the CUSUM test have been fixed at a change in the mean of size 1 associated with a threshold equal to 10, following the comparison study from reference [41] . The resulting false alarm rates and detection delays, obtained by applying this decision test on the residuals, for all the fault scenarios (except target evasion) and the two guidance laws are detailed in Table 5 . Hundred simulations were performed with random values drawn for uncertainty parameters reported in Table 3 . The mean values of the performance indices along with the corresponding standard deviation for this collection of tests are reported.
The false alarm rates and detection delays are quite small, with almost zero false alarm, and average detection delays of 1-2 s (comparable to those reported in other studies [14, 16, 17] ). Performances are similar for PP and PNG guidance laws.
Remark on robustness to wind turbulence
To assess the robustness of the method to external disturbances, a Dryden wind model is included in the simulation, similarly to other studies [17, 42] . The corresponding wind speeds are displayed in Fig. 18 . The residuals for the fault-free case in those conditions, for the PNG law, are shown in Fig. 17 . The main difference that can be observed with the nominal fault-free scenario is that the residuals are noisier. However, their zero-mean character is preserved due to the inherent robustness of the guidance feedback laws, even when wind gusts occur (e.g. around 60 s of the simulation). Therefore, detection of faults would still be possible in those wind conditions. Stronger wind gusts may however cause transient effects that may lead to false alarms, but this would be the case with about any FDI method. 
ANALOGY WITH OBSERVER-BASED FDI
The new FDI approach has been successfully applied to diagnose faults on sensors and actuators of a representative non-linear aircraft. With the objective of establishing an analogy with classical observerbased FDI [4, 5] in mind, this section investigates the application of the method to linear systems controlled by state feedback. Consider a non-faulty deterministic linear state-space model, which may for instance correspond to a linearization of the aircraft model
and the observer
The state-estimation error e x ¼ x Àx satisfies
and e x asymptotically goes to zero if L is chosen in such a way that (A À LC) is Hurwitz, which is always possible if the pair (C, A) is observable. Consider now a time-varying fault vector f affecting the state as
This model encompasses actuator, sensor and even structural faults, as f can take any value (this can be easily shown by substitution and change of variable). Equation (5.3) becomes
The estimation error is thus sensitive to faults, and the output estimation error e y ¼ y À ŷ can be used as a residual. This could also be expressed as e y ðsÞ ¼ CðsI n À A þ LCÞ À1 f ðsÞ in the frequency domain. If the Laplace transform of f, f ðsÞ= 2 kerfCðsI n À A þ LCÞ À1 g, which is very likely, then the residual is sensitive to f. This fault diagnosis scheme is equally used either for open-looped or closed-looped systems and corresponds to classical observer-based FDI.
The new closed-loop-control approach corresponds to a slight change of viewpoint. Assume that the pair (A, B) is controllable, and the pair (C, A) observable. A state feedback can then be designed to bring the state x of the system (or its estimatex if an observer is needed) to a desired reference value x ref , which can be taken equal to 0 without loss of generality. The main assumption of the new FDI method advocated in this article is that a suitable state feedback u ¼ ÀKx has been designed to achieve the control objective x ¼ 0 (at least approximately). The dynamical error of the closed-loop system in the absence of fault is given by
A classical result in control theory is that x asymptotically goes to 0 if K is chosen to have (A À BK) Hurwitz. Even though this shows a strong analogy with observer-based fault diagnosis (BK in (35) playing the same role as LC in (32)), using the distance between the measured state and the desired reference as a residual, has never been used in the fault diagnosis literature to address the diagnosis of closed-loop systems. This could be partly explained by the usual approach that considers systems as open-looped and solely checks the consistency between inputs and outputs to achieve FDI.
With the same faulty model (33) as earlier, (35) becomes is Hurwitz ð39Þ
If a fault vector f affects the system as _ x ¼ g ðx, uÞ þ f ð40Þ then (5.10) becomes
As observer-based fault detection can be extended straightforward by linearization, this result is very similar to (36) and shows that the distance between the reference and the observed regulated state or output is a residual indicative of the presence of faults affecting the process.
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
A new strategy to address fault diagnosis for closedloop controlled systems has been described in this article. The fault residuals are built from the knowledge of control objectives that should be achieved by the system. The structural sensitivity of these residuals to faults is then determined through an analytical study. The method has a very low computational cost, as the dynamical model of the system is not used to generate the residuals. The fact that the residuals are linked to the design of the control law is another interesting point, since the same residuals can be used to detect faults on several processes controlled with the same control law. The closed-loop character of the approach also makes it robust to model uncertainty, which is a critical point in classical modelbased FDI methods. The potential of the approach has been successfully demonstrated on a representative non-linear aircraft model, equipped with non-redundant sensors and classical actuators, suffering strong measurement and model uncertainty. Based on the control objectives of two common guidance laws (PP and PNG), residuals have been generated according to the new FDI approach. It has been shown that faults affecting sensors are detectable and isolable in this framework, and that actuator faults can be detected. The computation of quantitative indices have assessed the performance of the method. The impact of evasive target behaviour and wind turbulence have also been addressed.
A first step to formalize the method in the more global framework of linear and non-linear control theory has been accomplished by showing the analogy of the proposed method with the classical observer-based FDI scheme for linear(ized) models. The complete non-linear extension of the approach remains to be addressed. This strategy may be compared with other promising FDI methods on the basis of the test case, a comparison strategy is therefore needed to provide recommendations for aircraft securement. The results of the candidate approaches should be evaluated with respect to performance indices such as those used in this study. All the FDI strategies considered have some internal parameters that need to be chosen. To compare these strategies as objectively as possible, these inner parameters should be systematically tuned to achieve optimality in terms of the performance indices. The design of such a procedure is at the heart of current work. 
